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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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exhausted by defeat and depopulation and if Russia will ever weaken,
then once again the Polish Sector is predestined to be the first to
tremble beneath the force of a new and more terrible cataclysm.
Preoccupied with the conduct of the war, it seemed that the British
Government only in 1943 began to consider the problem of the future of
Europe after peace had been declared. During 1940-1942, London had
benevolently regarded plans for local federations, the federation between
Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, Union of the Middle Zone, Scandinavia
and the Western bloc. ... In March 1943, Churchill rather ambiguously
announced the project regarding the formation (at some indefinite time)
of a United States of Europe with a representative council. He " hardly
expected to see it fulfilled in his lifetime "—he was then about sixty-eight
years of age. This idea closely corresponded to Moscow's intention of
creating in Stalin's lifetime a chain of Soviet States throughout Europe
and Asia. The main difference lay in the ruling centre of such
a union—and for the Soviets this could only mean Moscow and for
Churchill and any European it could only mean London or some
other European city.
The British Prime Minister's scheme was both nebulous and late,
for after the entry of Japan and the U.S.A. into the war, the future of
Europe could not be settled without the settlement of the affairs of the
whole world. History was marching forward with gigantic strides—with
a speed unknown to former times . . .
Roosevelt's idea of the total destruction of Germany as a Power, one
of the most pregnant and revolutionary down the rniHenium of history,
meant at the same time the annihilation of that Europe who was sheltering
England from the East. If the policy of Russia pushing westward had
here-to-fore meant an increase in the surface of her friction with Germany,
now it covered . . . England. The British Government was caught
unprepared, for Churchill was preoccupied with the one thought that
Russia might stop fighting. It was only at Teheran Churchill at length
realised how Roosevelt's scheme of shaping the world into three Empires
meant in fact that there was at the present time only room for two—for
those two who had a definite programme and the intention of further
territorial expansion.
With this problem on the table at Teheran, with this halving of Europe
and the necessity of defending together with the Americans, the western
part of it, it seemed very much as if the sun was beginning to set on the
British Empire as a first-rate Power . . . The direct outcome of such
a division of Europe could only be the removal of the centres of political
and industrial strength from Europe to behind the Urals on the East and
in the West to the United States. Britain, after her years of struggle,
faced with the Soviets* domination of Europe, would therefore find
herself the Eastern buttress of the American World and unfortunately